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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Clifton W. PANOS, 
Petitioner/Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT of Tooele County, Case No. 20030344-SC 
and 
The Hon. Randall N. SKANCHY, 
Respondents, 
and Jennifer Ann CASTLE, 
Real Party in Interest/ 
Defendant. 
ADDENDUM TO REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER ON REHEARINC 
ON GRANT OF REHEARING ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHI-
BITION AND/OR MANDAMUS DIRECTING THAT RESPONDENT DIS-
TRICT COURT AND JUDGE LACK JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS 
SMALL CLAIMS ACTION ON APPEAL IN TRIAL DE NOVO, AND 
FURTHER REQUIRING THAT APPEALED CAUSE BE DISMISSED 
Brent M. Johnson, General Counsel to 
the Administrative Office of the Courts Clifton W. PANOS pro se 
and Attorney for the Respondents Petitioner and Plaintiff 
450 S. State Street, Suite N31 996 Oak Hills Way 
P. O. Box 140241 Salt Lake City, UT 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0241 84108-2022 
Paul H. Matthews & Associates, P.C. 
Counsel to Real Party in Interest/Defendant 
10 W. Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060 CO J 
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Exhibit "A" 
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
10 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -2060 
Telephone: (801) 355-7007 
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006 
February 12,2003 
Third District Court 
Tooele County, 
Small Claims Department 
47 South Main #141 
Tooele, Utah 84074 
RE: Panos v. Castle 
Civil No. 02-31 
OurFiIeNo.Allied-413 
Dear Clerk of the Court: 
Please file the enclosed original: 
1. NOTICE OF APPEAL. 
Please also find enclosed our check in the amount of $70.00 for the appeal. Please return 
your receipt in the enclosed self-addressed stamped envelope. 
Very truly yours, 
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Richard N.Barnes 
RNB:jbl 
Enclosures 
Letter to Court Ol.wpd 
b* *3 
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Exhibit "B" 
Paul H. Matthews (#2122) 
Richard N. Barnes (#8892) 
W. Kevin Tanner (#8872) 
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060 
Telephone: (801) 355-7007 
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE COUNTY, SMALL CLAIMS DEPARTMENT 
47 South Main, Tooele, Utah 84074 
CLIFTON W. PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JENNIFER ANN CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 02-31 
Defendant appeals to the District Court the final judgment entered in this case by Judge 
William E. Pitt of this court. 
DATED this il^d&y of February, 2003. 
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
/7/ 
Paul H. Matthews 
Richard N. Barnes 
W. Kevin Tanner 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this |jA day of February, 2003,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to be mailed through United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Clifton W. Panos 
996 Oakhill Way 
Salt Lake City, UT 84108 
Planitiff 
t ^iljA 
2 
Exhibit "C" 
A.L.R. — Right of independent expert w 
refuse to testify as to expert opinion, 50 
A.L.R.4th 680. 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
case to assistance of expert in social attitudes, 
74 A.L.R.4th 330. 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
case to assistance of chemist, toxicologist, tech-
specialist in substance analysis, 74 A.L.R.4th 
388. 
Right of indigent defendant in state criminal 
prosecution to ex parte in camera hearing on 
request for state-funded expert witness, 83 
AL.R.5th 541. 
ARTICLE VIII. HEARSAY 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) 
nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: 
(d)(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the 
statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony or the witness 
denies having made the statement or has forgotten, or (B) consistent with the 
declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge 
against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or 
(C) one of identification of a person made after perceiving the person; or 
(d)(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against a 
party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or a 
representative capacity, or (B) a statement of which the party has manifested 
an adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by 
the party to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a statement by 
the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency 
or employment, made during the existence of the relationship, or (E) a 
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Subsection 
(a) is in accord with Rule 62(1), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971). 
Subsection (b) is in accord with Rule 62(2), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). The hearsay 
rule is not applicable in declarations of devices 
and machines, e.g., radar. The definition of 
"hearsay" in subdivision (c) is substantially the 
same as Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). 
Subdivision (d)(1) is similar to Rule 63(1), 
Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). It deviates from 
the federal rule in that it allows use of prior 
statements as substantive evidence if (1) incon-
sistent or (2) the witness has forgotten, and 
does not require the prior statement to have 
been given under oath or subject to perjury. The 
former Utah rules admitted such statements as 
an exception to the hearsay rule. See California 
- o n n n o I ^ Q M Q 7 m
 W1'+Vi rpc,nprt t o 
Subdivision (d)(1) is as originally promulgated 
by the United States Supreme Court with the 
addition of the language "or the witness denies 
having made the statement or has forgotten" 
and is in keeping with the prior Utah rule and 
the actual effect on most juries. 
Subdivision (d)(1)(B) is in substance the 
same as Rule 63(1), Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1971). The Utah court has been liberal in its 
interpretation of the applicable rule in this 
general area. State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 
P.2d 388 (1957). 
Subdivision (d)(1)(C) comports with prior 
Utah case law. State v. Owens, 15 Utah 2d 123, 
388 P.2d 797 (1964); State v. Vasquez, 22 Utah 
2d 277, 451 R2d 786 (1969). 
The substance of subdivision (d)(2)(A) was 
contained in Rules 63(6) and (7), Utah Rules of 
Evidence (1971), as an exception to the hearsay 
rule. 
Exhibit "D" 
Paul H. Matthews (#2122) 
Richard N. Barnes (#8892) 
W.Kevin Tanner (#8872) 
PAUL H. MATTHEWS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendant 
10 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2060 
Telephone: (801) 355-7007 
Facsimile: (801) 355-6006 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COURT 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
47 South Maui, Tooele, Utah 84074 
CLIFTON W. PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JENNIFER ANN CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No. 038300082 ST 
Judge Randall Skanchy 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
)ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
I, Janet Layosa, having been duly sworn, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and am an individual residing in Salt Lake 
County, Utah. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the facts contained in this affidavit. 
3. On February 12, 2003 I called the Tooele Justice Court directly and spoke to a 
Justice Court Clerk. 
4. I specifically asked the Justice Court Clerk what the appropriate filing fee was for 
an appeal from a Justice Court small Claim's decision that is the subject matter of the present 
lawsuit. 
5. I was informed that the filing fee would be $70.00 and that I should forward a 
check in that amount with the Notice of Appeal filed in the present matter. 
6. I was not told by the Justice Court Clerk of any additional fees to this $70.00. 
7. Acting in reliance on the statements made by the Justice Court Clerk, I requested 
a check in the amount of $70.00 which was attached to the letter from Richard Barnes in his 
letter transmitting the Notice of Appeal to the Justice Court. 
Further saith naught your affiant. 
DATED this J ? day of February, 2003. 
Janet 
pf T+dt' 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this £1 day of February, 2003. 
My Commission Expires: /V\)A\ ^r\ ^co^ 
OjU^L OAJJL. 
otary Public 
«i* &&• HWR *t<n*i «s*t (sse** sassaa oasnt sessa exes* SEHS tsar 
Notary Public 
...% LAURIC. PARKE 
^» 10 West Broadway, Suite 750 
I \°V QSS^iP Jsl Sa l t L a k e CltV' U t a h 84101-2046 
1 \ & W i p r $ y My Commission Expires 
. N ^ T K f ^ April 27,2005 
L ^T*r-- ~- s t a t e of Utah 
Exhibit "E" 
CASE NUMBER 038300082 SC denovo Justice 
PROCEEDINGS 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
02-13 
•03 Case f i l e d by n e v a g 
•03 Judge SKANCHY a s s i g n e d . 
•03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC s c h e d u l e d on March 03 2003 a t 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
•03 
02-13-
02-13-
02-13-
02-13-
02-13-
02-13-
02-19-
02-19-
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 0 - 0 3 
0 2 - 2 0 -
0 2 - 2 4 -
0 2 - 2 4 -
0 2 - 2 4 -
0 2 - 2 6 -
0 2 - 2 6 -
0 2 - 2 7 -
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY. 
-03 Note: Address changed from 
•03 Note: Address changed to 1947 North 40 West Tooele UT 84074 
•03 Note: Address changed from 
•03 Note: Address changed to 996 Oak Hills Way Tooele UT 84074 
•03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 038300082 ID 5516736 
PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC. 
Date: 3/3/03 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84 074 
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
The reason for the change is Clerk error. 
-03 PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC scheduled on March 03, 2003 at 
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY. 
PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC Cancelled. 
Filed: Trial De Novo on Appeal from Justice Court 
Fee Account created Total Due: 70.00 
TRIAL DE NOVO Payment Received: 70.00 
Note: Code Description: TRIAL DE NOVO; Mail Payment; 
Filed: Notice of Appeal, Justice Court #02-31 
File from Justice Court received 
Faxed letter from Richard Barnes re: conversation with 
clerk on 2-18-03 . 
Fee Account created Total Due: 3.50 
COPY FEE Payment Received: 3.50 
03 Note: Address changed from 996 Oak Hills Way Tooele UT 84074 
03 Note: Address changed to 996 Oak Hills Way Salt Lake City UT 
84108 
03 Note: Plaintiff came in and received a copy of the notice for 
hearing on 3-3-03. 
Filed: Letter of Notice of Hearing on 3-3-03 (to plaintiff) 
returned to court. Address is wrong. 
03 Filed 
03 Filed 
Filed 
Filed 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
Filed 
Filed 
03 
03 
03 
03 
03 
Letter from Richard Barnes (original) 
Request for Continuance (PLA) 
Motion to Dismiss Appeal (Clifton Panos) 
Supplement to Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
PRETRIAL ON SC TRIAL DE NOVO scheduled on March 03, 2003 at 
01:30 PM in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY. 
PRETRIAL CONF ON SC APPEAL JC Cancelled. 
Filed: Copy of letter from attorney for defendant to Justice 
Court. 
nevac 
nevac 
luci." 
luci! 
neva< 
nevai 
neva 
luci 
luci 
neva 
neva 
neva 
neva 
neve 
neve 
neva 
neva 
she : 
nev, 
Printed: 04/14/03 13:51:22 Page 2 
\SE NUMBER 038300082 SC denovo Justice 
2-27-03 Filed: Letter to Court from plaintiff dated 2-27-03 
1-28-03 Note: On 2-27-03, after learning that Judge Skanchy had 
approved the request for continuance filed by Mr. Panos, I 
called both parties to notify them that the hearing would be 
cancelled for 3-3-03 and that they would be given notice of the 
reset date. 
-28-03 PRETRIAL ON SC TRIAL DE NOVO Cancelled. 
-28-03 Notice - NOTICE for Case 038300082 ID 5531253 
PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2003 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
4 7 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84074 
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
-28-03 PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS scheduled on March 17, 2003 at 01:30 PM 
in Room 321 with Judge SKANCHY. 
-28-03 Filed: Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to 
Dismiss Appeal 
-11-03 Filed: Request for Continuance (Clifton W. Panos) 
-12-03 Note: Mr. Panos filed a Request for Continuance of 3-17-03 
hearing. Per RNS, if both parties stipulate in writing, the 
continuance may be granted 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
lucilleh 
nevag 
17-03 Filed: Letter from Mr. Panos with attachment, faxed. 
17-03 Filed: Letter from Mr. Panos, original, with attachment. 
17-03 Filed: Notice to Submit for Decision 
17-03 TRIAL DE NOVO scheduled on April 08, 2003 at 09:00 AM in Room 
321 with Judge SKANCHY. 
17-03 Minute Entry - Minutes for PTC/ MOTION TO DISMISS 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Clerk: tawnil 
PRESENT 
nevag 
nevag 
nevag 
j uliek 
tawnil 
tawnil 
Plaintiff(s): CLIFTON PANOS 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RICHARD N BARNES 
Video 
Tape Number: 2003-017 Tape Count: 3:21 
HEARING 
This matter comes now before the court for pretrial on trial de 
novo and for hearing on plaintiff's motion to dismiss appeal. 
The Court having heard argument from respective parties, denies 
the motion to dismiss the appeal. Trial de novo is set for 4-8-03 
at 9:00 am. The parties are aware that this matter is double-set, 
and they are to keep in contact with this court. 
Lted: 04/14/03 13:51:27 Page 3 
Exhibit "F" 
3RD DISTRICT COUKT - iwjmii w « m 
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CLIFTON PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JENNIFER ANN CASTLE, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF 
PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No: 038300082 ST 
Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Date: February 28,2003 
PTC/MOTION TO DISMISS is scheduled. 
Date: 03/17/2003 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: Room 321 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN 
TOOELE, UT 84074 
Before Judge: RANDALL SKANCHY 
Dated this day of J^ . , 20_£^_. 
District Court Deputy Clerk 
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER, PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at(five days 
before your hearing, if possible). In all criminal cases and in 
some other proceedings, the court will arrange for the interpreter 
and will pay the interpreter's fees. You must use an interpreter 
from the list provided by the court. 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act# individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Julie Kroff 
at 435-843-4713 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. 
Wnrtr Bfetrid Court 
Tooele County Courthouse 
17 South Main 
fooele, Utah 84074 
\ddress Service Requested 
qqio 0JL iUii UJy 
Exhibit "G" 
Fax Transmission (No. of pages: 7) 
L i
-» . r ic r COL?nT ~ - *-
To: The Hon. Randall N. Skanchy Third District Court. Tooele County 
47 S. Main Street, Room 3 2 1 , Tooele, UT 84Q74-2f3Tm*Afrctyp.fr 688300082 ST 
Fox no.: (435) 843-3210 Telephone: (435) 882-85E# Date: March 1 5 th , 2001 
From: Clifton W. Panos, 996 Oak Hills Way, Salt Lake City, Utah 84108-2022 
Tele: (801) 582-0645 E-mail: clifpanos@yahoo.com 
Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 Does Mot Apply to Small Claims 
Code of Judicial Administration 4-803(H) specifically enjoins: 
"The trial de novo [and any pretrial proceedings pertaining to it] 
shall be tried in accordance with the procedures of small claims 
actions." 
Your Honor: 
Respecting the above-referenced case, today via mail I received from 
opposing counsel a Notice to Submit for Decision (copy appended hereto). 
This seems to indicate a reliance upon Judicial Administration Rule 4 - 5 0 1 , 
which does not apply in this matter. (Refer to provision of said rule 
indicated with circling in copy thereof hereafter annexed.) It was for this 
reason that I did not file a Notice to Submit for Decision with the Court 
myself, nor file a written request for a hearing with my principal 
memorandum in support of Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal. 
However, since adverse counsel has invoked the Court per C.J.A. 4 -501 , 
I, while not constrained per se by such, to some extent follow its precepts 
by herewith petitioning the Court for a hearing on the motion at this time. 
Also, I did not file a reply memorandum to Defendant's memorandum in 
opposition because my construing of Rule 6 of Small Claims Procedure was 
that I could make such a reply orally at the time of trial. If I was incorrect 
in this assessment, I would ask the Court to accept this communication as a 
motion to enlarge the time for filing said reply pursuant to Rule 6(b) of Civil 
Procedure. 
Finally, Judicial Administration Rule 4-501 (3)(G)'s provision "Alldispositive 
motions shall be heard at least thirty (30) days before the scheduled trial date" does not 
comport with Small Claims Rule 6(b)'s directive "No motions will be heard prior to 
trial". However, if a pretrial hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Appeal 
can be stipulated to. I so do, t r u s t i n g - i f « W f « ^ a l w p r s \ counsel and the 
Court itself are similarly amenable. 
Most respectfully, 
copy to: Richard N. Barnes, counsel for Ddfmii|u«A i-jy U Ll i t i^ Clifton W. Panos 
Exhibit "H" 
LexisNexis' Home Sources How Do I? Site Map What's New Help 
Search Terms: Herren 
FOCUS™ 
4 •?•/. 
Search Within Result* Edit Search 
In re ZELLA M. HERREN, Debtor. 
Case No. 91-01044-A CHAPTER 7 
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF WYOMING 
138 B.R. 989; 1992 Bankr. LEXIS 548; 22 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1334 
« previous Document 26 of 30 . 
nextn* 
April 8, 1992, Decided 
April 9, 1992, Filed and Entered 
JUDGES: [ * *1 ] Mai 
OPINIONBY: BY THE COURT; HAROLD L. MAI 
O P I N I O N : [*990] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
THIS MATTER came before the court on March 11 , 1992, for hearing on the United States Trustee's Objection 
to Fee paid to an entity called Wyoming Document Center. Paul Hunter appeared for the United States 
Trustee and Larry T. Ralls, Sr., appeared on behalf of the Wyoming Document Center. 
The court having considered the Motion, the statements and arguments of counsel and of Mr. Ralls, the 
exhibits, and being fully advised upon its own review of the applicable statutes and authorities, does hereby 
find and conclude as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Wyoming Document Center is a business located in Lander, Wyoming. Mr. Larry T. Ralls, Sr., is the 
President and General Manager of the business. At the bottom of the Document Center's stationery is the 
following statement: "Owned and Operated by Big Sky Investments, Inc. - Lander, Wyoming." 
2. Mr. Ralls is not an attorney and is not licenced to practice law in the State of Wyoming. 
3. The business of the Document Center is to prepare legal documents. In order to obtain clients, it 
advertises its services. 
[*991] 4. The Document Center provides potential clients with a document [ * *2 ] entitled "YOUR RIGHTS 
AS A CITIZEN." This document advises the client as follows: 
* * * A highly paid army of persuaders surround us with thousands of seductive messages each day that all 
say "buy, buy, buy". Credit that is readily available makes living beyond our means tempting as well as being 
difficult to resist the siren sounds of the advertiser. We are also told that if we fail to pay for it right on t ime, 
we are miserable deadbeats. * * * 
God forsake, if for some just reason, such as illness, loss of work, a bad marriage, or just plain bad planning, 
our ability to pay for the goods or services we need is interrupted. If this should happen our first feelings are 
fear and guilt. We may even feel that we have fundamentally failed as human beings. 
Nonsense, there is more to life than an A+ credit rating and lots of better things to feel guilty about than the 
dvismg of available exemptions from which to chose, defining terms in the schedules, directing what 
roperty is appropriately listed in various areas, summarizing and reformulating the information solicited 
"om clients, advising clients regarding responsibility to list all debts and the option of voluntary repayment 
nd similar actions, all require exercise of legal judgment beyond the capacity [ * *16 ] and knowledge of lay 
•ersons. In re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482, 485 (Bankr S.D. Cal. 1987); O'Connell v. David, 35 Bankr. at 144; 
\achmann, 113 Bankr. at 772-3. 
urther, the court finds and concludes that the Document Center's exhortation to "please don't delay . . . 
rour debt problem will not go away . . unless you act NOW", is itself giving legal advice. The unmistakable 
md ordinary meaning of the "Dear future prospect letter" is (1) to advise that bankruptcy filing should not be 
lelayed and (2) a representation that the client will thereby be rendered "absolutely debt-free, except for 
lormal living expenses." 
Such advice about the t iming of an anticipated bankruptcy filing is a matter which requires legal expertise, 
;ince from that date flows numerous consequences including the dischargeability of certain debts such as 
student loans and taxes, entit lement to discharge, recoverability of preferences, and maximization of 
exemptions. 
Similarly, while the written materials offer the advice, indeed the promise, that by filing proper documents 
:he client will become "absolutely" debt-free, this legal advice about the consequences [ * *17 ] of filing is not 
tempered with the unfortunate truth that many financial troubles arise from non-dischargeable debts. 
Further, read as a whole, and in the context of inclusion in the packet of forms, the "Routine Bankruptcy 
Procedure" document appears to advise the client what he or she can expect in their specific case and not 
)ust provide general information regarding bankruptcy law. n2 I t appears to assure the client that he or she 
can expect a total "fresh start" and the case closed within three (3) to six (6) months. This completely 
ignores the possibility of litigation over the dischargeability of debts or other frequent complications. 
Footnotes 
n2 E.g., I t does not inform the clients that 341 Meetings are frequently continued to another date in which 
case the debtor will again be required to appear. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2003(e). 
Encj Footnotes 
Section 329(b) applies to all persons who render legal services to the debtor in connection with, or 
contemplation of bankruptcy, including lay 'persons as well as lawyers. In re Grimes, 115 Bankr. 639, 649-50 
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1990); [ * *18 ] Bachmann, 113 Bankr at 775; In re Glad, 98 Bankr. 976, 978 (9th d r . BAP 
1989) (solicitation of financial information used to prepare petition and schedules was "legal services" 
rendered by nonattorney) r In re Fleet, 95 Bankr. 319, 338 [*996] (E.D. Pa. 1989) ("§ 329 provides court 
with alternative, plenary authority to regulate, enjoin, and impose monetary sanctions against lay persons as 
attorneys who bilk debtors in our court .") ; In re Telford, 36 Bankr. 92, 94 (9th Cir. BAP 1984). 
The execution of a contract classifying or categorizing the services rendered as "legal scrivener," "legal 
technician," or some similar term, does not insulate the provider from liability under § 329 if, in fact, the 
services are legal services. See In re Anderson, 79 Bankr. 482 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1987). similarly, a contract 
stating that the client understands that the services are not legal advice and are not provided by attorneys, 
does not insulate a lay person who engages in the actual unauthorized practice of law Id 
The actual typing involved in this case is minimal. In all cases in which a competent typist merely [ * *19 ] 
transcribes information filled out on official forms by the client, the time involved would be brief. I f extra t ime 
by a nonattorney is spent correcting, summarizing, or reformulating information provided by a client, that 
time is spent on the unauthorized practice of law Bachmann, 113 Bankr at 774 Such t ime spent in the 
unauthorized practice of law does not benefit a client. 
Any business "overhead" for advertising that constitutes solicitation for the unauthorized practice of law is 
similarly not a service which benefits a "pro se" debtor 
In conclusion, it is clear that the respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. As such, it is 
24. Mr. Ralls specifically denies that he gave Ms. Herren legal advice. He does admit that she informed him 
of her prior fi l ing, but asserts that he didn't advise her regarding the second filing 
25. Mr. Ralls represents that the Document Center's expenses for advertising, office overhead, and 
paperwork, result in a profit of $ 40 out of each $ 300 fee. 
26. After Ms. Herren filed her second Chapter 7 petition, Mr. Ralls sent letters to both the Office of the 
United States Trustee and to Ms. Herren's Chapter 7 trustee asserting that he did not represent her and 
never had. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 and 157. This Objection to Fee is a 
core proceeding within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) and (O). 
Despite the vehement disclaimers and the repetitive initialing of the fee contract provisions, the exhibits 
unquestionably establish that the Wyoming Document Center and its manager Big Sky Investments, Inc., are 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. 
I t is an unauthorized practice of law to prepare legal instruments by which legal rights are secured. See State 
ex rel Wyoming State Bar v. Hardy, 156 P.2d 309, 61 Wyo. 172 (Wyo. 1945). [ * *13] A bankruptcy petit ion, 
and the accompanying Statement of Affairs and Schedules, including the schedule of property claimed as 
exempt, are indisputably legal instruments by which legal rights are secured. 
Providing copies of the Official Forms necessary to filing a petition for bankruptcy relief is a legitimate and 
necessary service to the public. Similarly, a typing service that consists of solely transcribing written 
information furnished by clients is a service that may be legitimately provided by non-attorneys. In re 
Bachmann, 113 Bankr. 769, 774 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990). Even the "sale of printed material purporting to 
explain bankruptcy practice and procedure to the public" is permissible. Id, 
Nonetheless, the respondent's conduct has far exceeded these acceptable practices. By its Definitions of 
Schedules, and attached Blue Sheet, respondent has impermissibly provided specific direction as to the 
correct way to fill out the forms, including what property to list where. "[Typing services] may not make 
inquiries nor answer questions as to the completion of particular bankruptcy forms nor schedules nor answer 
questions as to the completion of particular [ * *14 ] bankruptcy forms or schedules nor advise how to best fill 
out bankruptcy forms or schedules " Id. 
"Actual preparation and direct or indirect filing for the debtor of Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 petitions, 
statements, schedules and Chapter 13 Plans" constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. O'Connell v. 
David, 35 Bankr. 141, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) modified 35 Bankr. 146 (E.D. Pa 1983) a f fd 740 F.2d 958 
(3rd Or. 1984). 
The solicitation of financial information and preparation of schedules is rendering legal advice, whether 
provided by lay persons or lawyers. In re Grimes, 115 Bankr. 639, 643 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1990). 
In connection with preparing legal documents such as the schedules, providing [*995] clients with 
definitions of such legal terms of art as "creditors holding secured claims," "real property," "executory 
contracts," and the like is, by itself, giving legal advice. 
Under the circumstances of this case, directing the client to "refer" to what appears to be a comprehensive 
list of Wyoming exemptions from which the client is to select assets is, by itself, the unauthorized practice of 
law. The only fair interpretation [ * *15 ] of the referral to the provided list is that one Document Center is 
advising the client of its opinion regarding available exemptions in Wyoming. I t makes no difference whether 
the Document Center's proffered legal advice was correct (occupancy necessary for homestead) or incorrect 
(omission of retirement and vehicle exemption). Either way, it is still legal advice, complete with statutory 
references. 
The exhibits in this case establish that the Document Center solicited business on the basis that it had a 
special expertise beyond that of a lay person ("it has to be done to perfection . . . it has to be immaculate 
before a federal court will accept it we feel you do need professional help . We will not leave your side 
in preparing the current documents which are required by law."). 
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Dixie R. Henry, Debtor, Pro se, Oceanslde, CA. 
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OPINIONBY: JOHN J. HARGROVE 
O P I N I O N : [*105] MEMORANDUM DECISION 
»gal knowledge, training, skill, and ability beyond those possessed by the average layman." Id. at 547. 
ccordmgly, the Court finds that the Fihppones' advice and explanations regarding differences between 
hapter 7 and Chapter 13 of the Code constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. 
* 111] C ADVICE REGARDING REAFFIRMATION OF DEBTS. 
IcMartm testified that Filippone explained to her the concept of "reaffirmation" of debts in reference to her 
ar. Specifically, McMartin testified: 
During my meeting [**21] with Mr. Filippone, he looked over the questionnaires and asked 
what I wanted to do about the car. I told him I wanted to keep the car. He then told me that I 
could re-affirm the debt and keep the car. I did not know what re-affirmmg a debt meant. So he 
explained it to me. 
ihppone then prepared the "Statement of Intention" for McMartin reaffirming her automobile debt. 
aker testified that during the course of her meeting with Filippone I I , she told him that she wanted to keep 
er van. She testified that Filippone II said that she could do that, but that she would have to reaffirm the 
ebt and keep making the payments. Baker further testified that although she understood she had to reaffirm 
ie debt to keep her van, she was not familiar with which Bankruptcy Code section dealt with reaffirmation 
or did she tell Filippone to use a Bankruptcy Code section on the Statement of Intention. On redirect 
xamination, Baker testified that she did not know what § 524 meant. Baker's Statement of Intention states: 
)escription of Property Creditor's Name Intention 
995 To/ota Previa LE/SC Toyota Motor Credit Corp Reaffirm 524(c)* 
524(c)- Debt will be reaffirmed pursuant to Sec. 524(c). 
**221 
(though there is no direct testimony on point, the Court finds that when Baker signed her bankruptcy 
leadings, including the Statement of Intention, the language regarding § 524 had been typed in by Filippone 
[, or by employees of USPS who had been instructed to do so by Filippone I I . 
mally, Hansen testified that after she had signed her bankruptcy pleadings and upon further review of the 
onformed copies of the bankruptcy pleadings, she noticed a document entitled "Chapter 7 Debtor's 
•tatement of Intention" which appeared to state that she and her husband had "reaffirmed" certain debts, 
he further testified that she had never been advised about "reaffirmation" by Filippone I I , did not know what 
meant, and had not prepared the "Statement of Intention." 
n connection with preparing legal documents, such as the Statement of Intention, providing clients with 
xplanations or definitions of such legal terms of art such as "reaffirmation" is, by itself, giving legal advice, 
•ee Herren, 138 B.R at 995 (providing clients with definitions of legal terms of art is giving legal advice), 
accordingly, the Court finds that the Fihppones and USPS have engaged in the unauthorized [**23] practice 
f law by explaining to debtors the legal term "reaffirmation" as the term is used in § 524(c). 
). ADVICE REGARDING THE TIMING OF FILING CHAPTER 7 PETITIONS. 
lansen testified that she met with Filippone II and discussed the timing for filing her Chapter 7 petition, 
lansen testified that she asked Filippone II whether it would be better to file a marital separation before or 
fter the bankruptcy proceedings and that he told her that she should file bankruptcy first. The testimony is 
inrebutted. The evidence also reflects that Hansen followed Filippone IFs advice and allowed USPS to file the 
>ankruptcy prior to her marital separation petition 
t is clear that Hansen not only sought Filippone II's advice, but relied on it as well. One court noted "such 
idvice about the timing of an anticipated bankruptcy filing is a matter which requires legal expertise, since 
rom that date flows numerous consequences [*112] including the dischargeability of certain debts such as 
tudent loans and taxes, entitlement to discharge, recoverabihty of preferences, and maximization of 
exemptions." Herren, 138 B.R. at 995. Furthermore, the interplay between the bankruptcy laws and the 
nantal [**24] dissolution laws complicates these issues. Accordingly, the Court finds that Filippone II 
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by giving advice to Hansen regarding whether she should file for 
bankruptcy prior to filing for separation. 
£ CLASSIFICATION OF DEBT. 
McMartm testified that she did not know whether a debt on a house which she had previously owned with her 
husband should be listed on her bankruptcy papers. She testified that as part of a divorce decree the house 
was quitclaimed to her husband. McMartm testified that Filippone advised her "that by including the debt on 
the house in my bankruptcy, I could 'sever my ties' with the house." McMartm also testified that prior to 
meeting with Filippone she did not know what an unsecured debt was and where these debts should be listed 
on her bankruptcy papers. She testified that Filippone "did that for me as well." Giving advice about whether 
a debt is secured or unsecured requires legal expertise. In re Harris, 152 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1993). Accordingly, the Court finds that Fihppone's advice and recommendations to McMartm on how to 
classify her debt constitute the unauthorized practice of law. [**25] 
F. ADVICE REGARDING DISCHARGEABILITY OF STUDENT LOANS. 
Baker testified that she discussed her student loan with Filippone and that he told her he did not believe it 
would be discharged in her bankruptcy. The Court finds that advising debtors on dischargeability issues 
constitutes the unauthorized practice of the law. Arthur, 15 B.R. at 547. 
The above incidents were not isolated events. A course of conduct involving the unauthorized practice of law 
by the Filippones was corroborated by Guyer. Guyer testified that as part of her agreement with Filippone, 
she was provided with copies of a "customer questionnaire" to be used in the preparation of bankruptcy 
cases. She testified that the questionnaire was not simply a blank copy of the bankruptcy petition, schedules, 
Statement of Financial Affairs, and Statement of Intention. The questionnaire did not ask the debtors for 
information necessary to fill out Schedule C (Exemptions), Schedule D (Secured Creditors), Schedule E 
(Priority Creditors), Schedule F (Unsecured Creditors), Schedule G (Executory Contracts and Unexpired 
Leases), or Schedule H (Co-Debtors). In addition, the questionnaire's "Financial Affairs" section did [**26] 
not contain all the questions found in the official form "Statement of Financial Affairs." 
Guyer further testified that her training included sitting in on debtor interviews with the Filippones. She 
observed the Filippones solicit information from the debtors that was not included in the questionnaire. She 
testified that Filippone would ask debtors whether they wanted to keep a credit card account and/or the 
property purchased with a credit card or surrender the property. This information was then used to prepare 
the "Statement of Intention." Guyer testified that during her training period, she also observed the Filippones 
explain to prospective debtors the difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 The Court has previously 
discussed Guyer's testimony regarding the Filippones' process of selecting exemptions for debtors. 
Although the Filippones deny that they ever practiced law and testified about disclaimers given both orally 
and in writing, the evidence contradicts these assertions. The Filippones had personal contact with the 
debtors during which the Filippones explained forms, procedures and terms such as "reaffirmation," selected 
exemptions, advised debtors on whether to file [**27] a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, and advised debtors on 
the timing of their anticipated bankruptcy. The personal contact coupled with the explanations and advice rise 
to a relationship of trust between the parties that is tantamount to that of an attorney-client. The Filippones 
analyzed the factual information received on the debtors' questionnaires and from personal interviews. The 
Filippones then exercised legal judgment in making various decisions for the debtors as set forth above. 
Given the [*113] extent of the personal contact, advice and counseling, it is apparent that a relationship of 
trust and confidence developed between the parties with the debtors trusting that the Filippones would 
prepare their bankruptcy petitions and related pleadings correctly. See Landlords' Professional Services, 215 
Cal. App 3d at 1599 (court found personal contact was a key factor in finding defendant engaged in the 
unauthorized practice of law). n l3 
Footnotes 
nl3 The court in Landlords Professional Services reviewed similar cases in other jurisdictions. For example, in 
Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Ore. 552, 538 P 2d 913 (1975) the court concluded that it was not an 
unauthorized practice of law to advertise and sell divorce kits so long as the service had no personal contact 
with a client. In New York Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, 234 N.E.2d 459, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 
(1967), the court found sale of Norman F. Dacey's book "How To Avoid Probate" was not an unauthorized 
practice of law since there was no personal contact or relationship with any particular individual so that there 
was no relationship of competence and trust established which is so necessary to the status of attorney and 
aron v. City of Los Angeles, 2 Cal. 3d 535, 541-42, 86 Cal. Rptr. 673, 469 P.2d 353 (1970). 
deciding whether an eviction service was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the appellate court 
People v. Landlords Professional Services, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599, 1608, 264 Cal. Rptr. 548 (4th Dist. 
)89) found: 
That such services do not amount to the practice of law as long as the service offered by 
[Landlords Professional Service] was merely clerical, i.e., the service did not engage in the 
practice of law if it made forms available for the client's use, filled the form in at the specific 
direction of the client and filed and served those forms as directed by the client. Likewise, 
merely giving a client a manual, even [ * *15 ] a detailed one containing specific advice, for the 
preparation of an unlawful detainer action and the legal incidence of an eviction would not be 
the practice of law if the service did not personally advise the client with regard to a specific 
case. 
\e court further commented: 
The advertisement used by LPS implies its eviction services were not limited to clerical 
functions. The tenor of the advertisement was that the service accomplished evictions. The 
advertisements' statement "Call & talk to us" was a general invitation for clients to discuss the 
matter of eviction with LPS. Bill Watts' LPS business card listed his title as "Counselor." In short, 
LPS cast about itself an aura of expertise concerning evictions. 
1 at 1608. 
le UST contends that the Filippones provided the following services: (1) giving advice and selecting 
.emptions for debtors; (2) giving advice regarding the selection of the appropriate bankruptcy Chapters; (3) 
ving advice regarding reaffirmation of debts; (4) giving advice regarding the t iming of filing bankruptcy; (5) 
ving advice regarding the classification of debt; and (6) giving advice regarding the dischargeability of 
udent [ * *16 ] loans For the reasons set forth below, the Court finds that the various services which the 
ippones performed constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
CALIFORNIA EXEMPTION LAW. 
jker, Camera, Hansen, nlO McMartm, Kaitangian and Sanchez testified that they had no prior knowledge of 
ihforma exemption law nor did they instruct the Filippones which California exemption they wished to 
lect. n i l The debtors also testified that they were not provided with any writ ten information describing 
.emptions available under bankruptcy law in California by anyone at USPS. The debtors testified that after 
ling out a questionnaire supplied by USPS, they would receive a telephone call to return to the USPS office 
sign their bankruptcy pleadings which were to be filed with the bankruptcy court. n l 2 When the debtors 
turned to sign the pleadings, a specific California exemption was claimed on their Schedule C. In other 
Drds, the Filippones chose the exemptions for the debtors. 
Footnotes 
L0 Although Scott and Theresa Hansen filed a joint petition, only Theresa Hansen testified in this 
oceedmg. Therefore, all references herein to Hansen are to Theresa Hansen [ * *17 ] 
LI California offers two sets of exemptions. California Code of Civil Procedure ("CCP") § 704 and CCP § 
)3.140 The latter is commonly known as the California "federal" exemption and Incorporates, for the most 
irt, the exemptions offered debtors under § 522(d) 
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OPINIONBY: Karen S. Jennemann 
OPINION: [*303] 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW REGARDING THE DETERMINATION OF REASONABLE FEES 
OF BANKRUPTCY PETITION PREPARER 
On June 5, 2001, the Court heard evidence on what constitutes a reasonable fee [*304] to pay a 
bankruptcy petition preparer for preparing bankruptcy pleadings in a consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy case 
and to establish guidelines for the determination of reasonable fees for similar cases in the future. These 
combined cases involve one bankruptcy petition preparer, Stacey Burnworth, and her company, Paralegal 
Paperworks, Inc. ("Paperworks"). Paperworks prepares bankruptcy [ * *2 ] petitions and related pleadings for 
prospective debtors, including the debtors in these cases, Ms. Landry and Mr. and Mrs. Pearson. 
The Court previously ruled that Ms. Burnworth was entitled to a fee of $ 50 for her services on behalf of the 
debtors. Ms. Burnworth appealed this decision, among others, and the United States District Court for the 
Middle District of Florida remanded both cases "for an independent finding of what constitutes an appropriate 
fee for services rendered by Appellant [Burnworth and Paperworks] based on current evidence both for and 
against any such award of fee, and for the establishment of guidelines which will assist the Bankruptcy Court 
in the future in carrying out its responsibility under Section 110 [of the Bankruptcy Code] to disallow 
unreasonable fees." (Adv. No. 99-00174, Doc. No. 49). 
lying to a large extent on the analysis of the District Court, this Court recognizes that in 1994, the 
nkruptcy Code was amended, in part, to recognize and to regulate the role of a bankruptcy petition 
sparer. A petition preparer is defined as "a person, other than an attorney, who prepares for compensation 
document for f i l ing." 11 U.S.C. § 110 [ * *3 ] (a)(1). Section 110(h)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code n l further 
Dvides that the bankruptcy court is required to disallow any bankruptcy petition preparer's fee found to be 
i excess of the value of services rendered for the documents prepared." 11 U.S.C. § 110(h)(2). 
Footnotes 
Unless otherwise stated, all references to the Bankruptcy Code refer to Title 11 of the United States Code. 
End Footnotes- -
e type of compensable services that a bankruptcy petition preparer can render are extremely l imited, 
tition preparers, who by definition are not attorneys, cannot give legal advice or otherwise engage in the 
authorized practice of law. In re Guttierez, 248 B.R. 287, 296, n.25 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000) (See cases 
ed therein). Clearly, as recognized by the District Court, a bankruptcy petition preparer cannot assist the 
btor in completing forms, provide legal advice that would assist a prospective debtor in making 
terminations as to which type of bankruptcy to file or which exemptions [ * *4 ] to take, or direct clients to 
rticular legal publications or specific pages so that they can attempt to find legal answers on their own. The 
ry act of directing a prospective debtor to review a particular section of a legal book in and of itself 
nstitutes legal advice. By focusing on one answer and excluding others, the bankruptcy petition preparer 
>ps over the line. As stated by the District Court, "Legal advice is legal advice, whether it comes directly 
im the petition preparer or indirectly via, for example, a bankruptcy treatise being recited by that preparer, 
rsons seeking legal assistance tend to place their trust in an individual purporting to have expertise in that 
2a." Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978). 
erefore, a bankruptcy petition preparer can expect to receive compensation only for secretarial-type 
rvices. As stated by the United States for the Western District of Texas in Guttierez: 
[*305] 
So what does § 110 tacitly permit? The answer in a nutshell is "not much." Section 110 itself 
proscribes virtually all conduct falling into the category of guidance or advice, effectively 
restricting "petition preparers" to [ * *5 ] rendering only "scrivening/typing" services. Anything 
else— be it suggesting bankruptcy as an available remedy for a debtor's financial problems, 
merely explaining how to fill out the schedules, or answering questions about exemptions or 
whether a claim is or is not secured will invariably contravene either state laws proscribing the 
unauthorized practice of law or other more specific provisions of § 110. The only service that a 
bankruptcy petition preparer can safely offer and complete on behalf of a pro se debtor after the 
enactment of § 110 is the "transcription" of dictated or handwritten notes prepared by the 
debtor prior to the debtor having sought out the petition preparer's service. Any other service 
provided on behalf of the debtor by a non-attorney (even telling the debtor where the 
information goes on the form) is not permitted under state unauthorized practice of law 
statutes, and so is also not authorized by § 110. 
i 
uttierez, 248 B.R. at 297-98. Thus, under § 110, the services a bankruptcy petition preparer can provide 
5 extremely l imited. 
bankruptcy petition preparer can meet a prospective debtor, provide forms or questionnaires [ * *6 ] for the 
btor to complete without any assistance from the bankruptcy petition preparer, transcribe the information 
pplied by the prospective debtor on the applicable bankruptcy forms without change, correction, or 
:eration, copy the pleadings, and gather all necessary related pleadings to file with the bankruptcy court. 
e bankruptcy petition preparer cannot improve upon the prospective debtor's answers, cannot counsel the 
ent on options, and cannot otherwise provide legal assistance to the prospective debtor, directly or 
directly. However, to the extent the bankruptcy petition preparer provides the limited secretarial-type 
rvices, the preparer is entitled to receive reasonable compensation. 
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Petitioner. 
Marilyn R. Brumbaugh, in proper person, for Respondent. 
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OPINIONBY: PER CURIAM 
O P I N I O N : [*1189] The Florida Bar has filed a petition charging Marilyn Brumbaugh with engaging in the 
unauthorized practice of law, and seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting her from further engaging in 
these allegedly unlawful acts. We have jurisdiction under our constitutional authority to adopt rules for the 
practice and procedure in all the courts of this state. Article V, Section 2(a), Florida Constitution (1968). We 
now issue an injunction, delineating in this opinion those acts of respondent which we deem to constitute the 
unauthorized practice of law, and ordering her to stop such activities. 
Respondent, Marilyn [ * *2 ] Brumbaugh, is not and has never been a member of the Florida Bar, and is, 
therefore, not licensed to practice law within this state. She has advertised in various local newspapers as 
"Marilyn's Secretarial Service" offering to perform typing services for "Do-It-Yourself" divorces, wills, 
resumes, and bankruptcies. The Florida Bar charges that she performed unauthorized legal services by 
preparing for her customers those legal documents necessary in an uncontested dissolution of marriage 
proceeding and by advising her customers as to the costs involved and the procedures which should be 
followed in order to obtain a dissolution of marriage. For this service, Ms. Brumbaugh charges a fee of $50. 
Of course, we must determine whether the Florida Bar has presented sufficient evidence in the record before 
us to prove that respondent has engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. But, in cases such as this, the 
Florida Supreme Court is not confined to act solely in its judicial capacity. In addition, it acts in its 
administrative capacity as chief policy maker, regulating the administration of the court system and 
supervising all persons who are engaged in rendering legal advice to [ * *3 ] members of the general public. 
Such authority carries with it the responsibility to perform this task in a way responsive to the needs and 
desires of our citizens. This principle has long been our goal. In State v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 595 (Fla. 
1962), we noted: 
The reason for prohibiting the practice of law by those who have not been examined and found 
Sieved that she was an attorney, or that she was acting as an attorney in their behalf. Respondent's 
ivertisements clearly addressed themselves to people who wish to do their own divorces. These customers 
lew that they had to have "some [ * *8 ] type of papers" to [*1191] file in order to obtain their dissolution 
marriage. Respondent never handled contested divorces. During the past two years respondent has 
ssisted several hundred customers in obtaining their own divorces. The record shows that while some of her 
jstomers told respondent exactly what they wanted, generally respondent would ask her customers for the 
Bcessary information needed to fill out the divorce papers, such as the names and addresses of the parties, 
le place and duration of residency in this state, whether there was any property settlement to be resolved, 
- any determination as to custody and support of children. Finally, each petition contained the bare 
legation that the marriage was irretrievably broken. Respondent would then inform the parties as to which 
Dcuments needed to be signed, by whom, how many copies of each paper should be filed, where and when 
ley should be filed, the costs involved, and what witness testimony is necessary at the court hearing, 
pparently, Ms. Brumbaugh no longer informs the parties verbally as to the proper procedures for the filing of 
le papers, but offers to let them copy papers described as "suggested [ * *9 ] procedural education." 
ie Florida Bar argues that the above activities of respondent violate the rulings of this Court in The Florida 
3r v. American Legal and Business Forms, Inc., 21A So.2d 225 (Fla. 1973), and The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 
30 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1974). 3n those decisions we held that it is lawful to sell to the public printed legal forms, 
-ovided they do not carry with them what purports to be instructions on how to fill out such forms or how to 
se them. We stated that legal advice is inextricably involved in the filling out and advice as to how to use 
jch legal forms, and therein lies the danger of injury or damage to the public if not properly performed in 
xordance with law. In Stupica, supra, this Court rejected the rationale of the New York courts in New York 
ounty Lawyers' Association v. Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, reversed and dissenting opinion 
Jopted 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 1967), which held that the publication of 
>rms and instructions on their use does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law if these instructions 
*e addressed to the public in general rather than to a specific individual [ * *10 ] legal problem. The Court in 
acey stated that the possibility that the principles or rules set forth in the text may be accepted by a 
articular reader as solution to his problem, does not mean that the publisher is practicing law. Other states 
ave adopted the principle of law set forth in Dacey, holding that the sale of legal forms with instructions for 
leir use does not constitute unauthorized practice of law. See State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 
16, 249 N.W 2d 1 (1976); Oregon State Bar v. Gilchrist, 272 Or 552, 538 P.2d 913 (1975). However, these 
xjr ts have prohibited all personal contact between the service providing such forms and the customer, in 
le nature of consultation, explanation, recommendation, advice, or other assistance in selecting particular 
>rms, in filling out any part of the forms, suggesting or advising how the forms should be used in solving the 
articular problems. 
Ithough persons not licensed as attorneys are prohibited from practicing law within this state, it is somewhat 
ifficult to define exactly what constitutes the practice of law in all instances. This Court has previously stated 
lat. 
. . . if the giving [ * *11 ] of such advice and performance of such services affect important rights 
of a person under the law, and if the reasonable protection of the rights and property of those 
advised and served requires that the persons giving such advice possess legal skill and a 
knowledge of the law greater than that possessed by the average citizen, then the giving of 
such advice and the performance of such services by one for another as a course of conduct 
constitute the practice of law. 
perry, supra, 140 So.2d at 591 
his definition is broad and is given content by this Court only as it applies to specific circumstances of each 
ase. We agree that "any attempt to formulate a [*1192] lasting, all encompassing definition of 'practice of 
iw' is doomed to failure 'for the reason that under our system of jurisprudence such practice must 
ecessanly change with the ever-changing business and social order.'" State Bar of Michigan v. Cramer, 
upra, 249 N.W.2d at 7. 
i determining whether a particular act constitutes the practice of law, our primary goal is the protection of 
^e public However, any limitations on the free practice of law by all persons necessarily affects 
nportant [ * *12 ] constitutional rights. Our decision here certainly affects the constitutional rights of Marilyn 
Exhibit "L" 
together with the words "Paid in Full" 
written on the account, is sufficient to 
prevent a finding of an amount due 
and owing, and, therefore, plaintiff has 
not carried the biirden of proof. As 
previously discussed, it was unneces-
sary for plaintiff to produce the note be-
cause of defendant's judicial admission, 
and, therefore, no presumption of payment 
can be garnered from non-production of 
the note. Plaintiffs evidence set forth 
above was sufficient to overcome any in-
ference of payment which was raised by 
the scratched out words, "Paid in Full," 
and we conclude the trial judge was cor-
rect in finding that plaintiff carried his 
burden of proof of the debt. 
[3-5] Plaintiff claims by his cross-
appeal that the trial court erred in failing 
to award attorney's fees in case of foreclo-
sure as provided by the mortgage. We be-
lieve the question to be moot even if attor-
ney's fees should have been allowed by the 
trial court because the record discloses that 
the mortgage was a purchase money mort-
gage. The property covered by the mort-
gage was sold to plaintiff on foreclosure 
during the pendency of this appeal for the 
amount of the trial court judgment. This 
judgment did not include an award for at-
torney's fees. There remain no secured 
assets with which to satisfy any judg-
ment that might now be awarded for 
attorney's fees. When a personal judg-
ment is entered against the mortgagor in 
the foreclosure of a purchase money mort-
gage, the excess over the amount realized 
from a sale of the mortgaged realty is 
.void. Stretch v. Murphy, 166 Or. 439, 447, 
112 P.2d 1018 (1941); ORS 88.070. In 
addition, upon redemption the defendant 
can be required to pay only the price paid 
for the property by the purchaser at fore-
closure sale plus those other charges pro-
vided by ORS 88.080 and 23.560(2). De-
fendant could not be forced upon redemp-
tion to pay a judgment for attorney's fees 
awarded subsequent to sale on foreclosure. 
The iudement of the trial court is af-
OREGON STATE BAR, a public 
corporation, Respondent, 
v. 
John W. GILCHRIST et al., Appellants. 
Supreme Court of Oregon, 
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Decided Aug. 7, 1975. 
State Bar brought suit to enjoin de-
fendants, who were not lawyers, from 
practicing law through advertising and sale 
of do-it-yourself divorce kits. The Circuit 
Court, Multnomah County, John C. Beatty, 
Jr., J., entered decree enjoining defendants' 
activities, and they appealed. The Su-
preme Court, McAllister, J., held that de-
fendants did not engage in "practice of 
law" in merely publishing, advertising and 
selling such kits and thus they could not be 
enjoined from engaging in that part of 
their business, but that all personal contact 
between defendants and their customers in 
nature of Consultation, explanation, recom-
mendation or advice or other assistance 
with regard to certain matters constituted 
the "practice of law" and had to be strictly 
enjoined. 
Decree modified, and as modified, af-
firmed. 
1. Dismissal and Nonsuit <S 4^6 
Nonsuit may only be granted in ac-
tions at law. 
2. Attorney and Client <§=>! 1(2) 
Persons, who were not lawyers, did 
not engage in "practice of law," in merely 
publishing by advertising and selling do-it-
yourself divorce kits, and thus they could 
not be enjoined from engaging in that part 
of their business. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
3. Divorce <£=>I46 
Anv person has unqualified right to 
and to settle related issues of property 
rights, child custody, support and visitation 
without help of either an attorney or forms 
contained with a do-it-yourself divorce kit. 
ORS 9.320. 
4. Attorney and Client <^>\\(2) 
With regard to sale of do-it-yourself 
divorce kits by persons who were not at-
torneys, all personal contact between such 
persons and their customers in nature of 
consultation, expla nation, recommendation 
or advice or other assistance in selecting 
particular forms, in filling out of any part 
of forms or in suggesting or advising how 
forms should be used in solving particular 
customer's marital problems constituted the 
"practice of law" and had to be strictly en-
joined. 
John Bassett, Milwaukie, argued the 
cause and filed a brief for appellants. 
Barry P. Caplan, Portland, argued the 
cause for respondent. With him on the 
brief were Daniel C. Ellis, Garry L. Kahn 
and Gino G. Pieretti, Portland. 
MCALLISTER, justice. 
The plaintiff, Oregon State Bar, brought 
this suit to enjoin the defendants John W. 
Gilchrist, Robert J. Lavorato and Bev Col-
oma from practicing law through the ad-
vertising and sale of do-it-yourself divorce 
kits. Defendant Bev Coloma consented to 
the entry of a decree against her as prayed 
for in the complaint and is not a party to 
this appeal, from an adverse decree the 
defendants Gilchrist and Lavorato appeal. 
The defendants John W. Gilchrist and 
Robert J. Lavorato, neither of whom are 
licensed to practice law, own and operate a 
business known as the Oregon Divorce 
Council. Their business consists of the 
sale of do-it-yourself divorce kits contain-
ing a manual for divorce, forms and in-
structions designed to enable an individual 
to complete and file the forms necessary to 
secure a dissolution of marriage. 
The kit includes / ^ a nf»+ifirm fn* ^i'ec^ 
marital settlement agreement; (d) an or-
der of default; (e) an affidavit of non-
military service; (f) a decree of dissolu-
tion of marriage; and (g) a manual for 
divorce which explains the forms and in-
structs the customer how to use them. 
The manual uses as an illustration the 
hypothetical case of Mary Jane Doe v. 
John Robert Doe. A sample passage of 
the manual reads: 
"MARY DOE PREPARES T H E 
P E T I T I O N TO DISSOLVE 
T H E MARRIAGE 
"In their determination to proceed with 
as little cost as possible, John and Mary 
called the OREGON DIVORCE COUN-
CIL for information as to the functions 
of the Council in assisting people to ob-
tain a divorce representing themselves. 
"Securing an appointment, they met with 
the Council's Executive Director, Jack 
Gilchrist, at which time the couple was 
informed of the functions of the Council 
and what would transpire in their pro-
ceedings for a divorce. 
"Director Gilchrist explained in depth 
the cost factors involved, what sequence 
of order the divorce action would follow 
in the court, and what was expected of 
each party. Moreover, John and Mary 
were instructed as to properly complet-
ing the 'Marital Settlement Agreement' 
and the need for such an agreement to 
simplify the divorce proceedings. The 
Director further explained the advantage 
of Mary being the petitioner and to that 
end, Jack agreed. 
"After registering with the Council as a 
new member Mary was given a T O R T -
FOLIO' that contained all of the proce-
dural information necessary to obtain the 
divorce, plus all of the official court 
forms that would be needed. 
"Taking the 'PORTFOLIO 1 home, Mary, 
with the help of John began preparing 
the petition and summons, the first 
married persons, determine child custody, 
support or visitation. 
"5. Advertising by any means or me-
dia the availability for sale of forms, 
which advertisements expressly or im-
pliedly represent that the forms which 
defendants have available for sale are 
sufficient to terminate a marriage, settle 
property rights between married persons, 
determine child custody, support or visi-
tation. 
"6. Suggesting contents of child cus-
tody, property settlement agreements en-
tered into by the parties to a divorce or 
aiding said parties in wording a child 
custody or property settlement agreement 
or a decree incorporating a negotiation 
of child custody, support, visitation, or 
the property rights of the parties. 
"7. Questioning prospective custom-
ers by form or otherwise in order to ac-
quire information necessary to the draft-
ing, filling out or choice of such forms, 
and 
"8. Carrying on any activity which 
will aid and abet defendants in the viola-
tion of items 1 through 7 of this decree." 
[1] The defendants assign as error the 
denial of their motion for an involuntary 
nonsuit. Since this is a suit in equity and 
a nonsuit may only be granted in actions at 
law, we need not concern ourselves with 
this assignment of error. 
The defendants concede that when they 
were interviewing customers, answering 
their questions, recommending forms to be 
used by particular customers and helping 
them to complete the forms and in any 
way counseling with customers, they were 
engaged in the practice of law. In their 
brief defendants concede: 
"While this court may find that the 
defendants did have personal contact 
with their customers and may have an-
swered questions which constituted the 
giving of legal advice, any such legal ad-
vice by defendants should be enjoined, 
the forms and written instructions 
should not be enjoined." 
[2] Defendants' basic contention is 
stated in their briei as follows: 
"While this court may enjoin the de-
fendants from acting in an advisory ca-
pacity to its customers in recommending 
or designing completed forms, the writ-
ing, advertising and sale of forms in 
combination with a text of material re-
lating to the completion of those forms 
which text is impersonal and involves 
nothing discretionary between defendants 
and customers should not be enjoined 
and the trial court decree should be mod-
ified in accordance therewith." 
We believe that paragraph 2 of the de-
cree unduly restricts the activities of the 
defendants and cannot be sustained. In 
our view defendants cannot be enjoined 
from merely publishing or selling their di-
vorce kits so long as the defendants have 
no personal contact with their customers. 
We find persuasive the holding in New 
York County Lawyers* Association v. Dac-
eyy 28 A.D.2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d 984, re-
versed 21 N.Y.2d 694, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422, 234 
N.E.2d 459 (1967). There it was held that 
the publication, distribution and selling of 
Norman F. Dacey's book "How to Avoid 
Probate" did not constitute the practice of 
law since the publication was directed to the 
general public and not to a specific indi-
vidual. The dissenting opinion in the Ap-
pellate Division, which was adopted by the 
Court of Appeals, stated in pertinent part: 
" * * * It cannot be claimed that 
the publication of a legal text which pur-
ports to say what the law is amounts to 
legal practice. And the mere fact that 
the principles or rules stated in the text 
may be accepted by a particular reader 
as a solution to his problem, does not af-
fect this. Courts and lawyers continu-
ously use and cite texts for this very 
purpose. So also with forms. The pub-
lication of a multitude of forms for all 
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children but they don't have the proper 
forms for that, or they come in and they 
don't have service accomplished, but the 
things that we do the most, that I do the 
most often with the people is to help 
them fill out the forms, because they 
come with them blank." 
The plaintiff called as witnesses only 
four persons who had purchased divorce 
kits from defendants. In each case a di-
vorce was obtained. In one case the form 
submitted to the court stated erroneously 
that the husband was to be awarded the 
home when in fact the parties lived in a 
rented house. The error was disclosed 
during the divorce hearing and corrected 
by the trial judge. 
In another case there was difficulty in 
obtaining service on the husband, who was 
a soldier stationed in Korea, and because 
of this complication, the customer engaged 
a lawyer to complete the proceeding. 
]n a third case the witness purchased a 
divorce kit and had the forms filled out by 
the defendants, but the forms were not 
used and the witness engaged a lawyer to 
obtain her divorce. 
In the fourth case the customer pur-
chased a divorce kit and after some delay 
obtained a divorce, but was dissatisfied, 
primarily because an automobile owned 
jointly with the husband was not awarded 
to her. 
In all four of these cases it is clear that 
defendants' employees were flagrantly 
practicing law by counseling with and giv-
ing advise to the customers. However, the 
plaintiff did not attempt to prove that the 
forms were not effective if used as direct-
ed. 
It may be that many laymen are not 
qualified on their own to select the proper 
forms and to complete the forms with the 
necessary exactitude to terminate their 
marriage and settle the related issues of 
property rights, child custody, support and 
visitation. However, the fact that some 
marriage does not justify preventing the 
defendants from advertising that marriage 
dissolution and its related issues can be ac-
complished by the use of the divorce kits. 
The Supreme Court of Florida has taken 
a different view and has held that the giv-
ing of specialized advice to a general audi-
ence rather than to a particular individual 
constitutes the practice of law. See The 
Florida Bar v. American Legal & Bus. 
Forms, Inc., 274 So.2d 225 (Fla.1973) and 
The Florida Bar v. Stupica, 300 So.2d 683 
(Fla.1974). 
Although defendants do not restrict the 
sale of their divorce kits to persons obtain-
ing noncontested divorces, it is clear that 
their advertising is directed primarily to 
persons in that class. Two of the adver-
tisements quoted supra refer particularly to 
"non-contested divorce". 
The Manual for Divorce, which is the 
explanatory textual material included with 
each kit, contains on the first page imme-
diately under the Table of Contents the 
following disclaimer in large type: 
"PUBLISHER'S MEMO 
* * * * * * 
"THE SERVICES PROVIDED IN 
YOUR MEMBERSHIP MAY NOT BE 
APPLICABLE FOR EVERYONE. 
YOUR COUNCIL RECOMMENDS 
THIS SERVICE ONLY FOR THOSE 
WHO CAN ENTER INTO A DE-
FAULT CATAGORY. FOR THOSE 
WHO MAY SUFFER OPPOSITION 
FROM YOUR SPOUSE BECAUSE 
OF CHILD CUSTODY, OR PROPER-
TY DIVISION, ALIMONY, OR ANY 
OF THE OTHER PROBLEMS THAT 
HAVE ARISEN BETWEEN THE 
TWO PARTIES, THE COUNCIL 
STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT 
YOU ENGAGE THE SERVICES OF 
AN ATTORNEY." 
[3] It should not be overlooked that 
ORS 9,320 provides that "any action, suit, 
or proceeding may be prosecuted or de-
to prosecute a suit to terminate his mar-
riage and to settle the related issues of 
property rights, child custody, support and 
visitation without the help of either an at-
torney or forms obtained from defendants 
or any other similar source. 
[4] We conclude that in the advertising 
and selling of their divorce kits the de-
fendants are not engaged in the practice of 
law and may not be enjoined from engag-
ing in that part of their business. We fur-
ther conclude, however, that all personal 
contact between defendants and their cus-
tomers in the nature of consultation, expla-
nation, recommendation or advice or other 
assistance in selecting particular forms, in 
filling out any part of the forms, or sug-
gesting or advising how the forms should 
be used in solving the particular customers 
marital problems does constitute the prac-
tice of law and must be and is strictly en-
joined. 
The decree of the trial court is modified 
in accordance with the foregoing opinion 
and, as so modified, is affirmed. 
The FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF ORE-
GON, as personal representative of the Es-
tate of Anton D. Elmer, Deceased, Appel-
lant, 
v. 
MOBIL OIL CORPORATION, Respondent. 
Supreme Court of Oregon, 
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Proceeding to determine timeliness of 
lessee's notice to renew lease was submit-
ted for decision upon agreed statement of 
case. The Circuit Court, Multnomah 
C o n n t v AlfrpH T Qti1mA«oHi T U^A *U„.I. 
notice was timely and lessor appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Tongue, J., held that 
statute providing that any act required to 
be performed on a holiday may be per-
formed on the next succeeding business 
day extends to acts to be performed as 
provided by contracts; hence where lease 
required notice to renew at least 30 days 
prior to expiration of current term, and 
the 30th day prior to expiration date was a 
Sunday, and on the next Monday lessee 
mailed notice of election to renew lease 
which also provided that notice would be 
deemed given at time of mailing, notice 
was timely. 
Affirmed. 
1. Time <3=*I0(I0) 
At common law, when the last day for 
the performance of an act required by con-
tract falls on a Sunday, the act may be 
performed on the following day. 
2. Time <^I0(I0) 
Rule that when the last day for per-
formance of an act required by contract 
falls on a Sunday, the act may be per-
formed on the following day is ordinarily 
to be applied in landlord and tenant cases 
for purposes of computing time for pay-
ment of rent or for giving notice to termi-
nate a tenancy. 
3. Time <@=>IO(iO) 
Statute providing that any act required 
to be performed on a holiday may be per-
formed on the next succeeding business 
day and no liability or loss of rights of any 
kind shall result from such delay extends 
to acts to be performed as provided by 
contracts, at least unless the contract spe-
cifically designates a Sunday as the day on 
which an act must be performed or as the 
last day on which the act may be per-
formed. ORS 27.010, 187.010(2). 
4. Time <&=>I0(I0) 
Where lease required that notice to re-
new be given at least 30 days prior to ex-
piration of term, and the 30th day prior to 
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In the Matter of New York County Lawyers' Association, Respondent, v. Norman F. Dacey et al . , Appellants 
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] 
Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, First Department 
28 A.D.2d 1 6 1 ; 283 N.Y.S.2d 984; 1967 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3230 
October 24, 1967 
PRIOR HISTORY: [ * * * l ] 
Matter of New York County Lawyers' Assn. v. Dacey, 54 Misc 2d 564, modified. 
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court at Special Term (Charles Marks, J.), entered September 12, 
1967 in New York County, which held appellant Dacey in contempt of court and fined him $ 250 and granted 
an injunction against all of the appellants. 
DISPOSIT ION: Judgment affirmed as to respondents Norman F. Dacey and Norman F. Dacey doing business 
as National Estate Planning Council, with $ 50 costs and disbursements to the petitioner. Under the 
circumstances, however, the terms of the judgment of the court insofar as it is directed against the 
respondents book publishers, distributors and sellers is limited to the enjoining of the acts and conduct on 
their part tending to promote the unlawful practice of law by Dacey in this State. Therefore, the injunctive 
provisions of said judgment, as affecting the respondents Crown Publishers, Inc., Doubleday & Co. Inc. and 
Brentano's Inc. are modified to restrain them from the further publication, advertisement, distribution and 
sale in New York of the present book "How To Avoid Probate!", and of any modification thereof which 
purports to induce lay persons [ * * * 2 ] to rely upon the legal advice or expertise of Dacey in the selection, 
use, completion or execution of legal forms, instruments or writings for the purpose of establishing any jural 
relationship or effecting the transfer or disposition of property; and said judgment is otherwise affirmed as to 
said last-named respondents, without costs and without disbursements. 
Settle order on notice. 
HEADNOTES: 
Attorney and client — unlawful practice of law — author, nonlawyer, of book containing legal 
advice and detachable forms of wills and deeds of trust wi th do-it-yourself instructions to laymen, 
"assumes to practice law" (Judiciary Law, § 7 5 0 , subd. B) and was properly adjudged in contempt 
of court — publishers and booksellers are enjoined from advertising, distributing or selling such 
book in New York. 
1. The first-named respondent, who does business under the name of National Estate Planning Council, and 
who is not a lawyer, "assumes to practice law" (Judiciary Law, § 750, subd. B; Penal Law, §§ 270, 271 , 280, 
subd. 3), and was therefore properly adjudged in contempt of court. He authored a book called "How To 
Avoid Probate!" consisting of about 55 pages of text and about 310 pages [ * * * 3 ] containing 26 declaration 
and deed of trust forms, 2 deed forms, 5 revocation of trust forms, 1 form of amendment of deed of trust, 
and 12 will forms, each in duplicate and perforated for removal from the book, and each with a page or more 
of instructions to laymen on how to use these "legally correct" forms so as to "avoid the delay, expense and 
publicity of probate of * * * your home * * * your bank account * * * your stocks and bonds * * * your 
automobile * * * your close corporation * * * your mutual fund shares * * * your small unincorporated 
business * * * your personal effects". Also in the book is an order form whereby a purchaser may order 
he book. 
[**997] Here the claim of unauthorized practice of law rests upon the writing and publication of this book of 
/hich some 600,000 copies have been sold. Petitioner complains also of the advertising which appears on the 
acket of the book. The advertising in question refers to Dacey as one of America's leading professional estate 
danners. The book, as the title indicates, attempts to inform the purchaser how to avoid probate. 
Petitioner asserts that by the appellants' representations to the public they were selling legal advice and they 
vere representing that Dacey was an expert qualified and competent [*173] to give such legal advice. 
Petitioner alleges the scheme and plan created by Dacey, and carried into effect by Crown Publishers Inc., 
vho published the book, and Doubleday & Co., Inc. and Brentano's Inc., who sold and distributed the book, 
institute the unauthorized practice of law; that Crown, Doubleday and Brentano's are equally responsible 
>ecause they have been engaged in aiding and abetting the [***28] unauthorized practice of law and that 
in injunction may issue under subdivision B of section 750 of the Judiciary Law, which section they assert is 
:lear and unambiguous. 
)acey contends that his acts cannot, as a matter of law, constitute the unauthorized practice of law in the 
ibsence of proof of the giving of specific advice to a specific individual about his particular problems; that the 
>ublication and distribution of a book containing forms is not the equivalent of giving specific advice to 
ipecific individuals about their particular problems, and does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. 
"he defendants urge several defenses based on contentions that subdivision B of section 750 violates 
lifferent articles of the Federal Constitution. In the view taken it is not necessary to consider these 
intentions, and attention is directed only to the question of whether the publication of this book constitutes 
>ractice of the law within the meaning of the section. 
Stripped of the arguments and the contentions of the various parties, the question may be briefly and baldly 
expressed: Does the writing, publication, advertising, sale and distribution of "How To Avoid Probate!" 
[***29] constitute the unauthorized practice of law within the meaning of subdivision B of section 750? It 
:annot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal 
)ractice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a particular 
•eader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. Courts and lawyers continuously use and cite texts 
:or this very purpose. So also with forms. The publication of a multitude of forms for all manner of legal 
situations is a commonplace activity and their use by the Bar and the public is general. In fact, many statutes 
and court rules contain the forms to be used in connection with them. Apparently it is urged that the 
:onjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled out, 
institutes the [**998] unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted 
:exts. 
[*174] Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a 
particular individual, Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the 
status [***30] of attorney and client. This is the essential of legal practice — the representation and the 
advising of a particular person in a particular situation. The lectures of a law school professor are not legal 
practice for the very reason that the principles enunciated or the procedures advised do not refer to any 
activity in immediate contemplation though they are intended and conceived to direct the activities of the 
students in situations which may arise. Moreover, there is no claim here as there was in the Connecticut 
proceeding ( Grievance Committee of Bar of Fairfield County v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129, 222 A. 2d 339, 
rehearing den. 387 U.S. 938) that Dacey, in effect, prepared instruments tailored to the particular needs of 
his customers. 
Special Term referred to and placed a measure of reliance on the determination of the Connecticut court in 
making its own determination. In the Connecticut proceeding against Dacey it was determined that in 
addition to the preparation of a 30-page booklet Dacey prepared trusts and wills adapted to clients' needs 
providing, at the same time, for large potential profits to himself in the sale of Wellington Fund shares on 
which he received [***31] a 6% commission. The court declared, when Dacey prepared wills and trusts for 
his customers and advised, as to the desirability in their circumstances, of the specific wills or trusts so 
prepared for them he engaged in the illegal practice of law. Certainly that case may readily be distinguished. 
At most the book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give 
personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. 
"How To Avoid Probate!" may be purchased by anyone willing to pay the purchase price. One is free to 
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§ 51.03 Statutes deemed to be in pari materia p. 2 0 1 
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when they relate to the 
-
 28Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793,22 Cal. Rptr. 
f144 (4th Dist. 1962). 
United States. Water Quality Ass'n Employees' Benefit Corp. v. U.S., 795 F.2d 
1303 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Alabama. House v. Cullman County, 593 So. 2d 69 (Ala. 1992). 
Connecticut. Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 41 Conn. App. 671, 677 A.2d 
•960 (1996), certification granted in part, 239 Conn. 905, 682 A.2d 999 (1996) and 
judgment rev'd on other grounds, 240 Conn. 671, 694 A.2d 1218 (1997). 
Kansas. Fought v. State, 14 Kan. App. 2d 17, 781 P.2d 742 (1989). 
North Dakota. Kroh v. American Family Ins., 487 N.W.2d 306 (N.D. 1992). 
Tennessee. State v. Davis, 654 S.W.2d 688 (Term. Crim. App. 1983). 
Virginia. Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 448 S.E.2d 625 (1994). 
Richards & Stearns, Shareholder By-Laws Requiring Boards of Directors to 
Dismantle Rights Plans Are Unlikely to Survive Scrutiny Under Delaware Law, 54 
Bus Law 607 (1999). 
me same purpose or object/ 
The rule of in pari materia is generally used when there is some doubt 
or ambiguity in the wording of the statute under consideration.3 
Characterization of the object or purpose is more important than 
characterization of subject matter in determining whether different 
statutes are closely enough related to justify interpreting one in light of 
the other.4 Yet courts have stated that each section of a law which deals 
with the same subject matter must be read in pari materia with other 
sections on the same subject.5 The doctrine of in pari materia for statu-
tory construction may be applied to executive orders.6 
In light of these rules there have been a plethora of decisions on the. 
issue of in pari materia. It has been held that sales tax and use tax 
statutes are construed in pari materia.7 Because a statute prohibiting 
driving while intoxicated and an implied consent statute were both 
regarded as serving the common purpose of highway safety, they were 
held to be in pari materia.8 Basic goals, in New Jersey, of the Uniform 
Commercial Code and the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Ownership 
Law, to protect the innocent or good faith purchasers are in harmony.9 
The Federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation 
and Liability Act (CERCLA) and the Minnesota Environmental Re-
sponse and Liability Act (MERLA) are in pari materia.10 Federal em-
ployees are permitted as a matter of course to bring suit under both 
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situation.33 It has been said that the "total corpus of pertinent law" 
may be considered.34 It should also be noted that courts have held that 
application of the rule must be applied before any other rules of statu-
tory construction.35 But a definition which relates specifically to a term 
as used in a single article of a code cannot be used in pari materia with 
other articles.36 
Since the purpose of an amendment is to make changes in the act be-
ing amended, great caution should be used in holding statutes in pari 
materia where an amendment is involved.37 Nevertheless it has been al-
lowed that "an amendatory act shall be construed in context with the 
act which it is designed to amend."38 An amended act comprises part 
of the legislative history of the amending act.39 
To be in pari materia, statutes need not have been enacted simulta-
neously40 or refer to one another.41 A marijuana trafficking statute and a 
statute defining "second or subsequent offense" as any drug offense 
^Pennsylvania. Bruzzi v. Bruzzi, 332 Pa. Super. 346, 481 A.2d 648 (1984). 
34United States. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 
235, 90 S. Ct. 1583, 26 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1970) (overruling on other grounds recognized 
by, Local Lodge No. 1266, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-
CIO v. Panoramic Corp., 668 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1981)) and (overruling recognized by, 
Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 847 F. 
Supp. 1294 (E.D. Pa. 1994)); U. S. v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420 (D.C. Cir. 
1975). 
Alabama. Kirkland v. State, 529 So. 2d 1036 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). 
' Wyoming. Matter of ALL 836 P.2d 307 (Wyo. 1992). 
35Indiana. Northwest Associates v. Board of Assessors of Burlington, 386 Mass. 
1006, 437 N.E.2d 235 (1982). 
36West Virginia. Waldron v. Leevale Collieries, 127 W. Va. 443, 33 S.E.2d 227 
(1945). 
37United States. Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act and Federal Employers' Li-
ability Act should be construed together whether or not the former is an amendment to 
the latter. Green v. River Terminal Ry. Co., 585 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ohio 1984), judg-
ment aff'd, 763 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1985). 
Oklahoma. Letteer v. Conservancy Dist. No. 30, in Tulsa, Osage, Rogers and 
Washington Counties, 1963 OK 218, 385 P.2d 796 (Okla. 1963). 
See ch 22. 
38Hutter v. Spenny, 8 Mich. App. 719, 155 N.W.2d 250 (1967). 
Califonia. In re Lee, 78 Cal. App. 3d 753, 144 Cal. Rptr. 528 (3d Dist. 1978). 
39Califonia. Fair v. Fountain Valley School Dist., 90 Cal. App. 3d 180, 153 Cal. 
Rptr. 56 (4th Dist. 1979). 
See ch 48. 
40United States. A code section providing liability for court costs would be read 
tncwtTifr w i t h annthpr cp^tinn epftinrr attr>rnp»w'o fiwo wrVior-o +k<a f n r m a r mnn -atmnnt^A „„ 
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stark - • . i'-. •. | (,. «i> paiMiu i K rule th.it l e g i s l a t i v e p r o v i -
ctnn^. •,«. ii|(;!i ,,[-, >n par ' n ;M-*t*ip sh ; " : 1 • K- ons tn i i ' i l toir^fhe'- >nnii<>c 
•
 f
 ;ouil." 
Tennessee. State ex icl. Strong ,. .Mrong, 1,5 ienn. 291, 133 S.W.id 99o
 v19j9); 
I A on- v. Rasar, 872 S.W.2d 895. 90 Ed. Law Rep. 504 (Tenn. 1994); Johnson v. 
Johnson. 40 I enn. \pp. 655. 292 SAV.2d 4~2 t\l)V>) 
Texas. Shelln \ State, 479 S.W.2d 31 ( lex. (Vim. App. 1972); Madeley v. Trustees 
ofConroe Independent School Hist., 130 S.W.2d 929 (Tex. Civ. App. Beaumont 1939), 
writ dismissed, judgment correct; Harrington v. State, 385 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Civ. App. 
Austin 1964), writ granted, (July 14, 1965) and judgment rev'd on other grounds, 407 
S.W.2d 467 (Tex. 1966); Texas Water Com'n v. Acker, 774 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. App. 
Austin 1989), writ granted, (Jan. 24, 1990) and judgment aff'd and remanded on ytlier 
grounds, 790 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1990), relfg of cause overruled, (June 13, !9'>n, 
Utah. Murray City v. Hall, 663 I\2d 1314 (Utah 1983). 
Vermont. Board of Trustees of Kellogg-Hubbard Library, Inc. v. Labor Relations 
Bd., 162 Vt. 571. M9 A.2d 784 < 11)91; 
Virginia. Branch \ Co... :•: \ a. App *16. 419 S.E.2d 422 (1992V 
Washington. < ;.. !• Pacilicorp, 118 Wash. 2d 167, 822 P.2d KG :••;-., , ^uite v. 
Andrews, 43 Wash. App. 49, 715 P.2d 526 (Div. 3 1986). 
W st Virginia. Concerned Loved Ones and Lot Owners Ass'n of Beverly mils Me-
morial Gardens v. Pence, 181 W. Va. 649, 383 S.E.2d 831 (1989); West Virginia Dept. 
of Health and Human Resources v. Hess, 189 W. Va. 357, 432 S.E.2d 27 (1993). 
v • onsin. Sentinel News Co. v. Industrial Commission, 224 Wis. 355, 271 N.W. 
413 (1937); State v. I emby, 108 Wis. 2d 521, 322 N.W.2d522 (Ct. App. 1982);North-
west General Hosp. v. Yee, 109 Wis. 2d 644, 327 N.W.2d 186 (Ct. App. 1982), deci-
sion rev'd on other grounds, 115 Wis. 2d 59, 339 N.W.2d 583 (1983); Schwetz v. 
Employers Ins. o( Wausau, 126 Wis. 2d 32, 374 N.W.2d 241, 27 Ed. Law Rep. 946 
(Ct. App. 1985) (overruled on other grounds by, Colbv v. Columbia County, 202 Wis. 
2d 342. 550 N.W.2d 124 (1996)); State v. Thomas, 128 Wis. 2d 93, 381 N.W.2d 567 
(Ct. App, 1985), review denied; Rossie v. State/Dept. of Revenue, 133 Wis. 2d 341, 
395 N.W.2d 801, 65 A.l..R.4th \ ivi (Ct. App 198<>:: P.irkv v. City of Madison, 199 
Wis. 2d 122. 545 N.W.2d 5ll> i( i. App. l^'G. 
V1'- >>ming. Carpenter & Carpenter v. Kingham, DO w >u. ^ ; i, IUV r._u ~+o ^ ^i941), 
opiniv.n modified on denial of reh'g, Carpenter & Carpenter v Kinoham. 56 Wvo. 314, 
110 P.2d 824 (1941). 
Gomez, The Consequences of Nonappearance: Interpreting New Sect on 242B of 
the Immigration and NationaliK \ct. 30 San 1 »-egi • 1 Rf "^ - 1w* i 
4Michigan. Michigan Ass'n of Intermediate Special Hduc. Administrators \ . Depart-
ment of Social Services, 207 Mich Ann '.<" ^> ^ » ' \ p * Q'-
 F(! G r »-p 1127 
(1994). 
5Unif- * -ncA. Kuwab v. brie Lackawanna k. , .,., b i . ._u o„ \i :\.L..^. red. 
863 (3d « G i): Julian v. Equifax Check Services, Inc., 178 F.R.I). 10, 40 Fed. R. 
Serv. 3d 944 (D. Conn. 1998): U.S. v. Lata. Gl !•' \\ IS"* ( Li Gir. 1 9 ^ 1 er denied, 
120 S Gt. 432 (U.S. 1990) 
The court will not blindly adopt H>.I .I lnterpreiauou on me mbii mat 
a statute of another jurisdiction- has . ... .... To do so would be a sacrifice of the 
deciding courts reasoned analysis and i .ent thinking. Custodio v. Boonprakong, 
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together;23 mail and wire fraiv statutes have been heldto be in ruu ma-
teria so that cases concerning one apph qualh • i: . sther -'' the \ cj" <{ 
Pav \ ;. iitle VII rl iih • : d Rights \cf ol 1 '64 and thi (lassihca-
. .. . \ . . A;-., .iii i.. j.ui materia as their purpose is to proudi uniformity 
ol" treatment for all employees;25 the sex disi lamination provisions of 
the cr-S rights employment discrimination statute must be -v u; -> 
harmc- \iih Hv pi«>\ MUIIS of the Equal Pay Act when determining 
:!i:- a: pnaic f.uk pay award;26 the extradition provision of the 
G: inform Reciprocal Knforcement of Support Act and the I n'oriri 
Criminal Hxtradition Act must be construed togethei when applied in 
criminal extradition proceedings for the crime of nonsuppon.-' the no-
fault and uninsured motorist statutes both relate to losses from inmries 
occurring in r,;'.«.<. non w M.'I motor vehicles arut should be "en*1 
materia since the\ relate to die same class of pet sons ih 
In like mannei me pj.-.-.a ;...:;» ag.Uiis, anung under the influence • 
aicuiu:i mirrors the prohibition against operating watercraft under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs of abuse and!- flTat extent the two statutes 
should K1 eons'r• •• • •'*• - • •••• 'S.^ -.t v:.\ harmonious tashion "! 
Ttisai-o imponant lo-s.i ".ine what <-t her forms of enactment might 
be included in a decision ! 01 example, it has been held that Rules ol 
Civil Procedure promulgated by a Supreme Court have the same force 
and etf. -J a> statutes passed be the legislature:'0 
Statutes have been held t- K: in pan materia whether indepei.d. I 
amendatory in lorm; whether m the form ;d'a complete enactment ueai-
ing with a single, limited suh-iet »".•«• • fsprtmn^ in . , . i^  ....».; 
::::Ne\v ^ (irk. Matter of Lstatc of Seaman, ,'s ;-,A .-d 4^1, 576 N.Y.S.2d 838, 583 
N.L.2d2 lM. ,l ,Wl). 
;
 24Unitcd States, D'Torio \ Adoni/.io, 554 F. Supp. 222 ( \I.I) Pa. 1082). 
?5United States. Grumbine \. I S, 586 F. Sup r ! l 44 i ( ) I ) ( >•• ). 
i 26United States. Crabtree v Baptist Hosp. of Gadsden, J IC, ",'4y l'.2d 1501 (11th 
Cir. 1985). 
27Georgia. In re Pace, 250 Ga. HO. 297 S F 2.1 255 (1082). 
.^Pennsylvania. 'Iucet v. State Farm Ins. Co., 5tH |>a. 44". 469 A.2d lt>25 i !'»s ?) 
2 90hio. State v. 1 ePard, 52 < )ln« \pp. 3d 83, 557 N.F.2d 166 (6th Dist. Guawa 
County 1989). 
30Pennsylvania. The statutory provision and the Rules of Civil Procedure relate to 
the same subject matter, partition of property, and therefore should be read in pari ma-
teria. Lonmiller v. Weidenbaueh. sir- Pa 1™) 4fi«) \ "»a S7S MOM , 
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p. Itttt 
unencumbered manner' •n.-n tin iar?nage of a ^tate act i> .copied 
from federal legislation, .v. its wil ordinarily construe the state statute 
in accordance with the construction given the federal statute '" n like 
manner, it has been held that the power to enact .nt\ ;esoluuon on 
a matter that is nko subject of a state statute i~ pu nutted if the icsolu-
tion and the statute can be harmonized '' The Michigan Supreme Court 
heh' '• '' , : e two statutes are construed together as the intent f both 
statutes in question is aitnetl at the same situation. < )ne provides a rem-
edy for highw a\ defects ami the other intends to provide l~ojd relief to 
designated benelieiarie- •• **o have sustained a loss as > result of a 
wrongful death.'- The Iowa Suprenu ( .mri nas held that he avail-
ability of different penaltie- for essentially the same conduct alone is 
not enough to prefer one statute over the other ,:! 
Pnmsion^ W- ,MIC .i>* 'uch a:«- omitted • another on die same 
subject matter will be applied when the purposes of the two acts are 
consistent." Prior statute** relating to the same Mihieil matter are 
compared with the nc», ^;ovision, ii n is possible bj reasonable 
"Carter v. Brodrick, (44 P.2:1 SS() (Alaska V^2). 
Connecticut. Hoard ol'Publu' Utilities Com'rs ol ('ii\ of Norwich \. Yankee Gas 
Services Co.. 230 (mm. 2X7. o72 A.2d 9 ^ i U>9n 
Mas^aohu^rtls ' : . • • . ' Metropolitan : )K. i '"in n. .••>,. \ l a ^ r I < • *•> \ 2u >S6 
(198.. 
" I o u a . , . T . .; . , • • i-#J. 
(Iowa 199"). 
12l.nd\kie\VR/ . Miilc lhyh.A„. ( oni ... i. . \i._:; 
" l ima . Slate v. Peters. 52- \ W .2d 854 (Ioua 199!. 
'H nited States. Milas v. U.S., 42 l;ed. CI. 704 (1999), all\l. I vv9 w ,. <S2D288 
(Vcd. Cir. 1999). U.S. v. Fixieo, 115 F.2d 389 ( C C A . 10th Cir. 1940); Richerson v. 
Jones. 551 F.2d918.43 A 1 R 1\ d. 191 i \\ fir N^~>. 
The deliberate selection oi' language so differing from that used in earlier Acts 
indicates that a change of law was intended. Gutierrez de Martinez v. 1 .aaiiuMi" ^15 
U.S. 417, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995). 
Alaska. Citizens Coalition for Tort Reform, Inc. v. McAlpine, 810 P.2d 162 (Alaska 
1991). 
Idaho. The amendment recognizes that the main purpose of punitive damages (deter-
rence) is destroyed when the wrongdoer dies. The fact that a similar amendment was 
not made to the later statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend to allow liv-
ing wrongdoers to escape the imposition of punitive damages. Gavica v. Hanson, 101 
Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980) (overruled on other grounds by, Sterling v. Bloom, 111 
Idaho 211.723 I\?d ^M1986)-
Illinois. Peonle e\ rel. Shrivjt . t viwen. J.b: .l> "'•••'• • i . . .^ •-• ^etcham 
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where the same word •»»• '-T!«- I* used in differeni M •' r m *ev.ii:.i* v\a: 
are similar in purpose aiui * >nient . ; where •• ATV-J - used 
more than uiuv i>, Use same section ''2fi The ^ame r.,.-.. -iaj> hecu applied 
even u here the language is only substan1, - - !.»• iH Hit r. vords 
used in a pri*»t M'tute to express a cenain meaning are omitu-d it will 
be presumed thai a change « f meaning was intended 21 Thus it ha ~ been 
said ""where a statnk ^ i!! eierence to one subject contain- s given 
See City of Buinngton . ;u;; ,vi, J J I I t)|- •'•* •> i juugmeni 
modified on other grounds, 471 F.2d 120 (8th C'ir. 1973) ( ' iduni^i id i .* in differ-
ent statutes should be given much the same meaning"). 
("f. Mate ex rel. American Piam. Co v. Siiprsior Court for King Cou;it\. id* Wash. 
676, 17b V V . T " ! " ! 5 1 ' 
When Mit)|wi liiatiet ib UilicitiM. >t i • -\ .Mi . .._... \ "^  . 
140 Conn. 650. 103 A.2d 535 (19^4). 
25C.1.K. \ Ridgeway's f.state, Nl 1 ,2u _ . . .. i ;:. :• M„ 
< <;<> tedieut. Connecticut Light and Power Co. \ . Costle, 1 ?> i -Jim. \.:.. -•.. . .._d 
1324 • -'S(M; In re Juvenile Appeal (83-< IK ISM Conn. 276, 455 A.2d 1313, 38 
A.I .R4ih "36(1983) 
Missouri. Citizens naiii- ,i.... , . : ••• iecun ^i Revenue. State of Mo.. C*9 
S.\V.2dxrWMo. 1982). 
New Mexico. State \. Johnson, ii4 .N..\.. u t,, lVJi, i JVb -,\MC.% 
79 (('t. App. 1W7), cert, denied, 124 N.M. 311, 950 P.2d 284 (1998). 
North Dakota Mai,. \ ('onus, 364 N \\ ?.d 88 (N 1 s | <S5, 
\doption of Abigail M.. 221 \\ ;^  2d ^81, 58o N.W.2d21 (Ct. App. 
•"< .. ..a. tjiulum \. ialienr. 235 Ga. 47. 218 S.E.2d 799 (197.^). 
Kti.hu. K>. Commonwealth \ Hates, 23A K\ 7 6v 32 S \\'.2d vU (1°30). 
27l'mu-d States. CherlkoiV I;. S., 676 F.2d 984 (4th Cir. 1982); Hazardous Waste 
1 realm* .a ( ouncil v. U.S.h.P.A . 861 F.2d 270 (I).('. Cir. 1988). 
Alabama. Kilgore v. Swindle, 219 Ala. ^ 8 . 122 So. 333 (1929). 
Califonia. Craven v. Crout, 163 Cal. \- • -.1 "70 ?09 O.i p..,. 
1985). 
District of Columbia, ^mi'f Distnci ol ( olumbia Dept. of Employment Ser-
• v s . 548 \.2d 95 (DC. 19*8 > 
Illinois. Lingwall v. lioener, tub ill. 2d2uo, vi in. Dec. 166,483 N.L.2d512( 198°; 
In re Marriage of Sutton, 136 111. 2d 441, 145 111. Dec. 890, 557 N.H.2d 869 (!«')(),. 
Indiana. Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co 166 1nH \nn ^M V^ ' !: ~><[ 
521 (3dDist. 1975). 
Massachusetts. School Committee of Brockton . leachers' Retirement Bd., 393 
Mass. 256, 471 N.E.2d61.21 Ed. Law Rep. 651 (1984); Petrucci \ . Board of Appeals 
ofWestwood,45 Maw \ p r C\ «iv ^o? \ : i" ?.! f i l ^ ) review denied 707N.E.2d 
1079 (Mass. 1999). 
Missouri. State ex rel. Hilbert \ ulaves, 268 Mo U'"--. ^6 S V\ . o85 , ivl6). 
However, a provision in one act emitted in another act on the same subject matter, 
when not inconsisicr -:>n. •. n N. ,....:, ;... > i > ••'- * -" 
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provision, the omission of such provision from a similar statute 
manner which reflects the integrity of both. Farmer's Bank of Antonia v. Kostman, 577 
S.W.2d 915 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 1979). 
New York. In re George Ringler & Co., 145 A.D. 361, 130 N.Y.S. 62 (1st Dep't 
1911), rev'd on other grounds, 204 N.Y. 30, 97 N.E. 593 (1912). 
Ohio. State ex rel. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Tomlinson, 99 Ohio St. 233, 
124 N.E. 220 (1919). 
Pennsylvania. In re State Highway Route No. 72, 265 Pa. 369, 108 A. 820 (1919); 
Com. v. Bigelow, 484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392 (1979). 
Where words of a later statute differ from those of a previous one on the same subject, 
they presumably are intended to have a different construction. Com. v. Buzak, 197 Pa. 
Super. 514, 179 A.2d 248 (1962). 
Virginia. Williams v. Matthews, 248 Va. 277, 448 S.E.2d 625 (1994). 
Washington. The omission of a similar provision from a similar statute usually 
indicates a different legislative intent. Clallam County Deputy Sheriff's Guild v. Board 
of Clallam County Com'rs, 92 Wash. 2d 844, 601 P.2d 943 (1979). 
West Virginia. Hall v. Baylous, 109 W. Va. 1, 153 S.E. 293, 69 A.L.R. 527 (1930). 
Wisconsin. State v. Welkos, 14 Wis. 2d 186, 109 N.W.2d 889 (1961). 
But cf. Board of Com'rs of Jackson County v. Branaman, 169 Ind. 80, 82 N.E. 65 
(1907); State ex rel. American Piano Co. v. Superior Court for King County, 105 
Wash. 676, 178 P. 827(1919). 
tion existed".28 
§ 51.03 Statutes deemed to be in pari materia 
Statutes are considered to be in pari materia when ilu-v : -!.;r-'' !-
a8Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793, 22 ua;. Rpti. 
144(4thDist. 1962). 
United States. Water Quality Ass'n Employees' Benefit C~r - rT ^ . nc>5 F.2d 
1303 (7th Cir. 1986). 
Alabama. House .;;ii;iai. <. ,;....!._>, yj •  :•;.., _a i, J
 vAla. 1992). 
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